Editoria
A few months ago, the world’s media were speaking of a war that was supposed to change the balance of power in the Middle East forever. From Washington to Tel Aviv, talk revolved around “final victory” and a “new regional order.” Today, however, those same governments speak of ceasefires, agreements, negotiations, and crisis management. Not because the crisis has come to an end, but because its continuation has generated costs whose containment has become a more urgent issue than the war itself.
A few months ago, the world’s media were speaking of a war that was supposed to change the balance of power in the Middle East forever. From Washington to Tel Aviv, talk revolved around “final victory” and a “new regional order.” Today, however, those same governments speak of ceasefires, agreements, negotiations, and crisis management. Not because the crisis has come to an end, but because its continuation has generated costs whose containment has become a more urgent issue than the war itself. This remains one of the central themes of the present issue of Political Courier.
Yet the Middle East is not the only stage upon which the crisis unfolds. In Albania, thousands have taken to the streets against a project associated with Jared Kushner, chanting “Albania is not for sale.” In Portugal, workers’ strikes continue. From the Balkans to the Middle East, and from Europe to North America, signs of a common reality can be observed: the crisis has neither subsided nor been brought under control; only its forms of manifestation have changed. These new forms of crisis, and the questions they raise before us, are also addressed in this issue through brief analyses of the Portuguese strikes and the so-called “Flamingo Revolution.”
The Iranian left, despite the transformations that have taken place in its appearance and notwithstanding the new polarizations that have emerged in the ways certain circles within the milieus of Council Communism and the European Communist Left express themselves, remains trapped within the framework of its inherited traditions. From this perspective, we will also examine the actions of the Iranian Left at the International Labour Organization. In this connection, the Internationalist Workers’ Organization has republished one of its historical documents, written twenty-five years ago as a critique of trade-unionism and similar forms of activism.
What we are witnessing today is not merely a collection of separate crises. War, economic stagnation, migration, the housing crisis, distrust of political institutions, the growth of populism, Trumpism, Eurocentrism, and the expansion of social protests are different expressions of a single process. It is a process in which existing political and economic structures are becoming increasingly incapable of resolving their own crises, while the dominant alternatives continue to operate within the framework of that same crisis-ridden order.
Contemporary capitalism functions not only through exploitation in the workplace, but also through a network of states, international institutions, ideological apparatuses, media systems, and political intermediaries. For this reason, class struggle is constantly confronted with the danger of being diverted from its own path and transformed into one of the mechanisms for managing the crisis of capital. During wartime, workers are called upon to support one camp or another. During strikes, their struggles are transferred to negotiating tables and institutional procedures. On the international level, their protests are delegated to organizations and institutions that are themselves integral parts of the existing order.
The articles in this issue of Political Courier approach this reality from different angles: from war and diplomacy in the Middle East to the protests in Albania, from workers’ strikes in Portugal to protest actions directed at the International Labour Organization. The common thread running through all these developments is not merely the existence of crisis, but the inability of dominant solutions to move beyond it. The fundamental question therefore remains:
Will the emancipation of workers be achieved through states, international organizations, political intermediaries, and professional representatives? Or will it emerge through the working class’s own capacity for independent organization, the expansion of its struggles, and the creation of internationalist links?
In a world where the crisis of capital has assumed global dimensions, class independence is no longer merely a slogan; it is a necessary condition for any emancipatory perspective.
An Agreement to Manage an Impasse
Only a few weeks ago, Donald Trump was speaking of the complete surrender of the Islamic Republic. Western media outlets predicted the collapse of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” the dismantling of Iran’s regional networks, and the birth of a new Middle East. Israel pursued the war with the expectation that it could alter the regional balance of power once and for all in its favor. On the other side, the Islamic Republic sought to preserve its regional position, deterrent capabilities, and network of influence, while using the war as an opportunity to restore part of its eroded legitimacy both at home and across the region.
Yet the survival of the Islamic Republic in this conflict should not be mistaken for a resolution of its deeper crises. Even if the regime succeeds in preserving part of its regional position and remains one of the major actors in the Middle East, the accumulated economic, social, and political contradictions within Iranian society will not disappear. War and militarization may temporarily function as a shield against social discontent, but they cannot eliminate the underlying tensions that shape everyday life. In the period ahead, the working class and other oppressed layers of society—the forces responsible for production, social reproduction, and the functioning of society itself—will continue to represent the most significant potential challenge to the existing order.
Today, however, none of the objectives proclaimed at the beginning of the war have been achieved. Neither has the project of reshaping the Middle East under American and Israeli hegemony succeeded, nor has the Islamic Republic managed to conceal its profound internal crises behind the smoke and fire of war. What has emerged instead is not a path toward military victory but a growing effort to contain the consequences of the conflict itself. This shift is significant because it reveals the failure of the war’s original aims.
The same powers that only recently spoke of destruction, surrender, and the comprehensive reconstruction of the region are now discussing ceasefires, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the release of frozen Iranian assets, a ceasefire in Lebanon, and a return to negotiations. The political meaning of this change should not be underestimated. A war that was expected to produce a decisive outcome through military force has reached a point where its continuation must now be managed through agreements, containment, and the temporary reconfiguration of the balance of power.
If the reports concerning the proposed agreement are accurate, the process appears to be unfolding in several stages. The first phase reportedly includes de-escalation in the Strait of Hormuz, the reopening of maritime routes, the release of part of Iran’s frozen assets—estimated in some reports at between twenty-four and twenty-five billion dollars—and preparations for a new round of negotiations. Other reports refer to a ceasefire in Lebanon, efforts to prevent a wider regional war, and commitments framed around national sovereignty and the principles of the United Nations. No official text has yet been published, and a distinction must therefore be made between media reports and any final agreement. Nevertheless, even these reported provisions are sufficient to indicate the political direction of current developments.
A war that began with calls for the complete surrender of the Islamic Republic, the destruction of its missile capabilities, and the restructuring of the Middle East is now moving toward an agreement in which the release of Iranian assets, the reopening of Hormuz, a ceasefire in Lebanon, and the acceptance of certain regional realities have become central issues. This cannot reasonably be described as a victory for the Islamic Republic. The regime emerges from the conflict having suffered significant military, economic, and political costs and will inevitably be forced into a period of internal reorganization and reconstruction.
At the same time, it would be equally misleading to ignore the fact that the declared objectives of the United States and Israel have also failed to materialize. What is taking shape today is less a victory for one state or another than evidence of the failure of a project that sought to impose political submission through military superiority.
The reasons for this political failure cannot be found solely in diplomatic calculations or behind-the-scenes negotiations. Much of it was determined on the battlefield itself. Iran’s missiles and low-cost drones, its capacity to disrupt energy routes, the threat posed to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the possibility of the conflict expanding into Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and the resilience of regional forces aligned with Tehran all contributed to raising the costs of war.
The conflict has once again demonstrated that under contemporary conditions, overwhelming air power and technological superiority are no longer sufficient to impose political outcomes. Aircraft carriers, strategic bombers, and advanced missile systems retain immense destructive capabilities, but they cannot by themselves guarantee the political results their operators seek. It is precisely this reality that has pushed Washington and Tel Aviv away from the language of “complete surrender” toward the language of “crisis management” and negotiated arrangements
Another factor behind the current impasse is the growing importance of energy routes and the reproduction of the global economy. The Strait of Hormuz is far more than a maritime passage. It is one of the vital arteries of global capitalism. Any disruption there affects energy prices, transportation costs, insurance markets, international trade, and production chains across the world. When the closure or insecurity of a single shipping route can destabilize global markets, the issue ceases to be merely a conflict between states. It becomes a crisis affecting the reproduction of the global economy itself.
Yet the present deadlock is not simply the product of conditions in the Middle East. The crisis at the center of the world system has also played a decisive role. The United States today faces one of the deepest political and institutional crises in its recent history. The rise of Trumpism is not merely the rise of a politician or an electoral movement. It reflects deep fractures within the institutions and power structures of the United States itself. The divide between Republicans and Democrats is no longer simply an electoral rivalry. It increasingly expresses conflicting views over America’s role in the world, the management of global crises, relations with traditional allies, and even the role of the federal state within the United States.
This crisis is also reflected in Washington’s relations with NATO, the European Union, and its regional allies. The world today is no longer the world of the 1990s—a world in which the United States could easily impose its political will through military superiority. We have entered a period in which regional powers, energy corridors, asymmetric warfare, low-cost military technologies, and global economic crises have all contributed to eroding the monopoly of power once enjoyed by the traditional centers of imperialism.
For this reason, any future agreement should not be interpreted as the end of the war. What is emerging is not peace, but a reconfiguration of the conflict itself. The rivalry between Iran and Israel, tensions among competing power blocs, energy crises, and proxy wars will continue. Only their form of expression is likely to change. If Israel is ultimately forced to retreat from a broader confrontation with Hezbollah, this will not represent a solution to the Lebanese question. Rather, it will amount to a temporary recognition that regional actors and proxy forces remain an integral part of the balance of power in the Middle East.
The recent conflict offers another important lesson. The expansion of war does not automatically mean that society is entering a revolutionary phase. As the war between Russia and Ukraine has already demonstrated, war can weaken the capacity of the working class for independent organization just as easily as it can intensify social contradictions. It can strengthen militarism, encourage nationalism, and push social struggles onto the defensive.
The current conflict, which has directly or indirectly involved more than ten countries, has so far done far more to strengthen states, expand security apparatuses, deepen poverty and social instability, and weaken independent class struggles than to advance the workers’ movement. This reality once again demonstrates that neither crisis nor war contains a solution in itself. What remains decisive is the ability of the working class to organize independently, maintain its political independence from all competing camps, and transform the crisis of capitalism into a conscious struggle against the system as a whole.
Otherwise, wars will not open a path toward emancipation. They will merely prepare the ground for a new cycle of destruction, militarization, and the reproduction of capitalist domination.
The Middle East has entered a new phase—a phase in which no force is capable of fully imposing its will upon others and in which no crisis can be conclusively resolved. Under such conditions, agreements do not mark the end of conflicts. They are temporary pauses within a prolonged process of reconfiguring the balance of power.
What stands before us today is not the victory of one state or another, but a sign of a deeper crisis within the global capitalist order itself—an order increasingly incapable of producing stability and therefore forced to carry its crises from one war to another, and from one temporary agreement to the next..
The remaining articles in this issue will be made available to readers soon.
